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SIMPLIFYING STATE STANDING: THE ROLE 
OF SOVEREIGN INTERESTS IN FUTURE 
CLIMATE LITIGATION 
Abstract: As Congress has yet to enact a comprehensive legislative frame-
work to address climate change, environmental advocates have increas-
ingly turned to the judiciary to push for the regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Some lawsuits have been brought against the federal govern-
ment, but others have been brought against private entities under com-
mon law causes of action. This Note focuses on the state standing and 
separation of powers dynamics at play in this area of litigation, and con-
siders recent arguments that states suing as parens patriae against private 
polluters should be entitled to a relaxed standing regime. It concludes 
that complex common law claims involve discrete separation of powers 
concerns that give rise to a dangerously unpredictable array of prudential 
justiciability limitations, and therefore proposes that state litigants invoke 
their sovereign interests in regulating environmentally harmful activities 
as the basis for standing in future climate litigation. Such interests present 
the types of concrete and particularized injuries that satisfy separation of 
powers concerns, and asserting standing on this basis reinforces federal-
ism values by ensuring that states remain important ancillary enforcers of 
national environmental policies. 
Introduction 
 Federal courts appear to be in broad agreement that climate 
change is happening and that humans are the primary cause.1 Several 
have disagreed, however, as to whether the judiciary is the proper 
branch of government to resolve claims related to global warming.2 In 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507–09, 521–26 (2007) (discussing interna-
tional studies of climate change and reasoning that the EPA’s failure to regulate automo-
bile emissions caused physical harm to the state); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 
F.3d 309, 341–49 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that allegations of harm caused by defendant 
power companies’ greenhouse gas emissions were sufficient to support standing to sue), 
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174); Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that global warming 
“is not itself an event so much as it is a sequence of events”), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 
(9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010). 
2 Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526 (holding that petitioners had standing 
to sue based on injuries related to climate change), and Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 332, 349 
(holding that a climate change suit did not present nonjusticiable political questions and 
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its 2007 decision Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
a state petitioner had standing to sue the Environmental Protection 
Agency due to the agency’s refusal to regulate automobile greenhouse 
gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.3 Less than six months later, 
however, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
dismissed a state-led public nuisance action concerning automobile 
greenhouse gas emissions in its 2007 decision California v. General Motors 
Corp.4 Although the district court did not address standing, it reasoned 
that Massachusetts v. EPA demonstrates that claims relating to green-
house gas emissions involve policy questions reserved to the political 
branches, and it therefore dismissed the nuisance action by invoking 
the political question doctrine.5 
 Despite the California court’s dismissal of the common law nui-
sance action, several scholars have argued that Massachusetts v. EPA enti-
tles states to litigate complicated environmental suits in federal courts 
in their capacity as parens patriae,6 an English common law doctrine that 
allows states to litigate on behalf of their citizenry.7 This Note analyzes 
these arguments in light of the separation of powers principles the Su-
preme Court has often invoked when justifying restrictive justiciability 
thresholds and concludes that, insofar as Article III standing is con-
cerned, states suing in their common law capacities should be entitled 
to a relaxed regime.8 The Note demonstrates, however, that particularly 
complicated common law actions give rise to separation of powers con-
cerns embedded in the prudential justiciability doctrines, which may 
provide a basis for dismissal in addition to, or in lieu of, Article III 
                                                                                                                      
that plaintiffs had standing to sue in a common law nuisance action), with Kivalina, 663 F. 
Supp. 2d at 883 (holding that a nuisance claim was barred by the political question doc-
trine and that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue), and California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 
06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing a nuisance claim 
on political question grounds), and Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395, 
401 (D.D.C. 1992) (“Notwithstanding the seriousness of the phenomenon, there is no 
‘global warming’ exception to the standing requirements of Article III or the [Administra-
tive Procedure Act].”). 
3 549 U.S. at 526. 
4 See 2007 WL 2726871, at *16. 
5 See id. at *12–13, 16. 
6 See, e.g., Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citi-
zens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701, 
1767–68, 1775–80 (2008); Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 Fla. 
L. Rev. 249, 277–80 (2009); Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massa-
chusetts v. EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 Geo. L.J. 1059, 
1073–78 (2008). 
7 See Zdeb, supra note 6, at 1068–70. 
8 See infra notes 153–169 and accompanying text. 
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standing.9 Thus, as an administrative law petition adjudicated within 
the confines of a statutory scheme, Massachusetts v. EPA offers relatively 
little help to states suing in their common law capacities and faced with 
prudential justiciability challenges, which counsel dismissal when a 
plaintiff alleges harms that are widely shared and unfamiliar to the le-
gal landscape.10 
 Ironically, Massachusetts v. EPA is precisely the type of case that 
would ordinarily give rise to a heightened justiciability threshold, as the 
Supreme Court’s restrictive standing jurisprudence has been justified 
almost entirely on the separation of powers concerns implicated by law-
suits brought against the federal government.11 The Court has never 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 321–33 (analyzing defendants’ motion to dismiss a common 
law nuisance action on political question grounds); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871–77 
(relying on the political question doctrine to dismiss a nuisance action); Gen. Motors Corp., 
2007 WL 2726871, at *5–16 (same); Michael B. Gerrard, What the Law and Lawyers Can and 
Cannot Do About Global Warming, 16 Southeastern Envtl. L.J. 33, 39–40 (2007); Matthew 
Hall, A Catastrophic Conundrum, but Not a Nuisance: Why the Judicial Branch Is Ill-Suited to Set 
Emissions Restrictions on Domestic Energy Producers Through the Common Law Nuisance Doctrine, 
13 Chap. L. Rev. 265, 267–68 (2010). Notably, in a brief filed in the Supreme Court on 
behalf of the Tennessee Valley Authority—a defendant in the American Electric nuisance 
lawsuit—the U.S. Solicitor General argued that the Supreme Court should dismiss the 
common law action on prudential standing grounds rather than Article III standing 
grounds. See Brief for the Tenn. Valley Auth. as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 13–
25, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, No. 10-174 (U.S. filed Jan. 31, 2011). The Solicitor 
General also acknowledged that the nuisance action raised separation of powers concerns 
addressed by the political question doctrine, but argued that the plaintiffs’ lack of pruden-
tial standing provided a sufficient alternative basis for dismissal. Id. at 33–42. 
10 See Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *12; Gerrard, supra note 9, at 40 (“While 
the United States Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA afforded broad standing to states 
to challenge administrative action, that is a far cry from entertaining what could well be-
come the largest mass tort in the history of the world.”); infra notes 170–190 and accom-
panying text. As the court in General Motors Corp. stated: 
The underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Massachusetts only re-
inforce this Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s current tort claim would re-
quire this Court to make the precise initial carbon dioxide policy determina-
tions that should be made by the political branches, and to the extent that 
such determination falls under the [Clean Air Act], by the EPA. 
2007 WL 2726871, at *12. 
11 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–51 (2009); Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62, 577 (1992); Heather Elliott, The Functions of 
Standing, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 459, 463, 485–86 (2008); Mary Kathryn Nagle, Tracing the Origins 
of Fairly Traceable: The Black Hole of Private Climate Change Litigation, 85 Tulane L. Rev. 477, 
480, 509 (2010) (noting the irony that Article III standing was initially developed in the 
context of lawsuits brought under statutory schemes, but has now migrated over to lawsuits 
seeking common law relief for private injuries); Zdeb, supra note 6, at 1075–78 (arguing 
that a requirement that states satisfy restrictive standing tests when suing as parens patriae 
would be inconsistent with the historic purpose of the state standing doctrine). 
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offered a similar separation-of-powers justification for restrictive stand-
ing requirements in common law actions brought by states against pri-
vate parties.12 By resurrecting the common law to combat global warm-
ing, however, climate tort litigants have uncovered a distinct separation 
of powers concern: the risk that the judiciary will undemocratically set 
policies that have consequences far beyond the actual adjudicated dis-
putes.13 Unlike Article III standing, which focuses a court’s attention on 
the parties to the lawsuit, the prudential justiciability doctrines permit a 
court to account for broader implications of the issues raised in the 
lawsuit—particularly, whether the plaintiff’s claims raise issues of a 
“transcendently legislative nature.”14 
 In light of Massachusetts v. EPA’s limited applicability to parens pa-
triae environmental lawsuits, this Note proposes that state attorneys 
general explore creative ways of establishing state regulatory and law-
making interests as the basis for standing in environmental litigation.15 
Rather than reading Massachusetts v. EPA as a parens patriae suit, state 
litigants should adopt a regulatory or sovereign interest interpretation 
of the case; this theory of standing suggests that where states can dem-
onstrate injury to their ability to regulate environmentally harmful ac-
tivities, they should be entitled to a relaxed justiciability regime when 
challenging federal agency action—or even inaction—that burdens 
state lawmaking interests.16 Unlike common law tort actions, such law-
                                                                                                                      
 
12 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 
275, 289–90 (2008); Nagle, supra note 11, at 479–86; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, 577–78 
(explaining that Congress established Article III courts to adjudicate cases involving indi-
vidual rights that have been harmed by private action or unauthorized administrative ac-
tion); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 863 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that plain-
tiffs asserted “private, common-law claims of the sort that have been long recognized to 
give rise to standing . . . [and not] any public-law claims that might raise concerns the 
standing doctrine is designed to guard against” (citations omitted)), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049 
(5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (restoring the trial court’s dismissal of a nuisance action). 
13 See, e.g., Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876; Hall, supra note 9, at 267–68. 
14 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(concluding that the broad reach of issues presented to the court in global warming nui-
sance action revealed the “transcendently legislative nature of this litigation”), rev’d, 582 
F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Matthew S. Melamed, A Theoretical Justification for Special Solicitude: 
States and the Administrative State, 8 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 577, 579, 591–92 
(2010) (noting that standing focuses on the litigant seeking judicial relief, whereas the 
political question doctrine focuses on the nature of the issues presented to the court). 
15 See infra notes 191–235 and accompanying text. 
16 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1015, 1072–74 
(2010); Tyler Welti, Note, Massachusetts v. EPA’s Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the 
Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1751, 1765–68 (2008); see also Amy J. Wil-
dermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. Land Resources & En-
vtl. L. 273, 311–15 (2007). Recent scholarship highlights that Supreme Court preemption 
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suits fall short of directly punishing private polluters, but they can offer 
a more direct route into federal court to achieve what creative public 
nuisance actions ostensibly aim for: the effective regulation and mitiga-
tion of widespread environmental harms.17 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the contemporary justi-
ciability framework, with particular attention to the separation of pow-
ers rationales the Supreme Court has articulated as a justification for 
restrictive standing requirements.18 Part II then discusses the roles 
these justiciability doctrines played in the two most prominent global 
warming cases to date: Massachusetts v. EPA and Connecticut v. American 
Electric Co., a 2009 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit for that is currently under review by the Supreme Court follow-
ing oral argument on April 19, 2011.19 Part II also discusses recent 
scholarship and lower federal court opinions restrictively interpreting 
Massachusetts v. EPA, and underscores the attention courts have paid to 
states’ regulatory interests as a basis for relaxing standing require-
ments.20 Part III then uses a separation of powers analysis to demon-
strate why scholars are correct that states suing in their common law 
capacities should have as easy a time establishing Article III standing as 
Massachusetts did in Massachusetts v. EPA, but it proceeds to highlight 
an element that prior scholarship has largely missed—that the very na-
ture of common law nuisance actions gives rise to justiciability concerns 
embedded in the prudential standing and political question doc-
trines.21 In light of the heavy burden states have faced at the threshold 
                                                                                                                      
decisions from the 2008–2009 term, coupled with the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, indicate that the Court may be comfortable providing states with greater standing 
rights when a federal agency claims that its actions preempt state lawmaking efforts, either 
under a sovereign interest or parens patriae standing framework. See Gillian E. Metzger, 
Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 66–70 (2011). 
17 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 330 (noting that federal common law can fill in gaps of fed-
eral regulatory frameworks); Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, The “Gift” That 
Keeps on Giving: Global Warming Meets the Common Law, 10 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 109, 114–15 
(2008) (arguing that common law litigation serves as a default tool for public plaintiffs 
seeking to vindicate environmental harms when federal law provides an inadequate 
framework for recourse); Nikhil V. Gore & Jennifer E. Tarr, Case Comment, Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co., 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 577, 585 (2010) (arguing that states 
should be granted rights of action in the carbon tort context in part because “[w]here the 
federal government has chosen not to act, the power to speak in the common interest 
resolves to the states”); see also Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 112 Penn St. L. Rev. 1, 51, 63 (2007). 
18 See infra notes 24–96 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 97–148 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 122–137 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 149–190 and accompanying text. 
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of climate tort actions, Part IV proposes that state attorneys general 
seek to establish standing by identifying ways in which state lawmaking 
and regulatory interests may have been injured by ineffective federal 
environmental regulation.22 Doing so would provide states with a re-
laxed justiciability threshold, and would more directly put the states 
into an ancillary role in ensuring that national policies and laws ade-
quately counter the causes and effects of widespread pollution.23 
I. Historical Requirements of Justiciability 
 The common law public nuisance doctrine has been characterized 
as an “impenetrable jungle,”24 and federal courts have evaluated the 
justiciability of nuisance actions brought in the climate change context 
through two frameworks: (1) Article III standing, which seeks to ensure 
that the action has been brought by a proper party; and (2) the politi-
cal question doctrine, which seeks to screen out cases that give rise to 
issues of a non-judicial nature.25 This Part provides an overview of both 
doctrines as well as the prudential standing doctrine.26 Section A intro-
duces the constitutional requirements of standing to sue, which have 
largely been developed in the context of lawsuits brought by private 
citizens against the federal government.27 It also provides an overview 
of state standing doctrines, which often take into account the distinct 
interests states have in litigating to protect public interests.28 Section B 
then discusses the discretionary thresholds of prudential standing and 
the political question doctrine.29 
                                                                                                                      
22 See infra notes 191–235 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 191–235 and accompanying text. 
24 See P. Leigh Bausinger, Note, Welcome to the (Impenetrable) Jungle: Massachusetts v. EPA, 
The Clean Air Act and the Common Law of Public Nuisance, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 527, 527 (quoting 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 616 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 
1984)). 
25 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 321–32, 341–49 (2d Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174); Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871–82 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-
17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755, 2007 WL 
2726871, at *5–16 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2007). 
26 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (discussing the 
importance of prudential standing in ensuring judicial restraint when the judiciary is faced 
with issues of “great national significance”); infra notes 78–96 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 30–77 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 53–77 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 78–96 and accompanying text. 
2011] State Standing in Climate Litigation 1071 
A. The “Irreducible Minimums” of Standing 
 As a prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction, Article III standing is 
meant to ensure that courts hear only “cases” and “controversies,” the 
constitutional bases for judicial power.30 The doctrine can be reduced 
to a simple question: Is the litigant entitled to have the court decide the 
merits of the dispute?31 Most federal courts, however, analyze standing 
under a far more complicated test first articulated in 1992 by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife : plaintiffs may proceed 
with a claim if they can show (1) they have suffered an “injury-in-fact” 
that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent; (2) 
that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the de-
fendant; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that 
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.32 Given the multi-
faceted approach to the injury-in-fact requirement alone, many suits 
alleging widely shared environmental harms have been dismissed for 
lack of standing.33 Additionally, the “fairly traceable” causation re-
quirement renders complicated environmental lawsuits, such as climate 
tort claims, particularly vulnerable to dismissal.34 The level of scrutiny a 
court actually applies to a plaintiff under the standing test may vary, 
however, depending on the court’s view of the underlying separation of 
powers issues implicated by the suit.35 
                                                                                                                      
 
30 See U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992). 
31 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
32 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. In Lujan, the Court held that environmental groups 
challenging a regulation promulgated under the Endangered Species Act (1) did not as-
sert sufficiently imminent injury to have standing, and (2) claimed an injury that was not 
redressable. Id. at 562–71. 
33 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–53 (2009); Lujan 505 
U.S. at 562–67, 571–78. A five-justice majority in Summers v. Earth Island Institute held that a 
group of environmental organizations suing the U.S. Forest Service did not have standing 
to challenge the agency’s decision to exempt a salvage sale of timber from certain proce-
dural requirements. See 129 S. Ct. at 1147–51. The Court identified the petitioners’ failure 
to specify the dates they would revisit the affected forest as one of the reasons for the hold-
ing. See id. at 1150–51. 
34 See Nagle, supra note 11, at 514–15; see also Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 345–47 (relying in 
part on Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 
64 (3d Cir. 1990), a pre-Lujan Clean Water Act decision, for the proposition that mere 
contribution to an injury is sufficient for causation). 
35 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 547–48 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(noting the inherent flexibility of the modifiers “fairly” and “likely” in the Lujan standing 
test, and arguing “in considering how loosely or rigorously to define those adverbs, it is 
vital to keep in mind the purpose of the inquiry”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, 577–78; Richard 
Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60 Admin. L. 
Rev. 943, 959–60 (2008); see also Elliott, supra note 11, at 466–68 (highlighting arguments 
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1. Article III Standing and the Separation of Powers 
 Although the Supreme Court has called Article III standing “per-
haps the most important” justiciability doctrine courts use to screen out 
undeserving claimants,36 it was not formally articulated as a way to limit 
disputes to “cases” and “controversies” until the middle of the twentieth 
century.37 With the rise of statutory rights to judicial review and the 
liberalization of formal common law pleading standards, the Supreme 
Court began formulating standing requirements as a way to limit its 
jurisdiction.38 The test articulated in Lujan had been earlier developed 
within the context of actions brought by private citizens against the 
federal government, and was in part a reaction to Congress’s enact-
ment of statutory provisions allowing individuals to seek judicial review 
of executive agency action.39 In these “public law” actions, the Court 
dismissed cases in which the plaintiff did not allege a violation of a per-
sonal right or traditional injury—such as a tort or property harm—but 
instead sought only to vindicate the public interest in assuring the 
proper enforcement and execution of federal laws.40 
 The Supreme Court has primarily justified the restrictive standing 
framework on separation of powers principles.41 The attention the 
Court actually pays to separation of powers concerns, however, has var-
ied depending on the justices’ underlying views of the particular issues 
at stake in a given case.42 In some cases, a majority of the justices has 
                                                                                                                      
that the standing doctrine hides what are essentially normative decisions about the proper 
scope of government action, and arguing that standing is built on several ideas of the sep-
aration of powers). 
36 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The other justiciability doctrines include 
ripeness, mootness, political question, and abstention. See Elliott, supra note 11, at 465. 
37 See Mank, supra note 6, at 1705 n.9 (identifying Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 
(1944), as the first Supreme Court case explicitly stating the Article III standing require-
ments); Murphy, supra note 35, at 968 & n.160. 
38 See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 792–
93, 817–18 (2004); Hessick, supra note 12, at 290–92. 
39 See Hessick, supra note 12, at 289–90; Nagle, supra note 11, 486–93; Cass R. Sunstein, 
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 
194–95 (1992). 
40 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78; Hessick, supra note 12, at 296. 
41 See Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148–49; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 577; Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 
(maintaining that standing “is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of pow-
ers”); see also Elliott, supra note 11, at 467–75 (suggesting that by ensuring concrete adver-
sity between parties, standing imperfectly serves at least one separation of powers func-
tion); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 891–97 (1983) (arguing that a liberalized approach to 
standing represents a threat to the separation of powers). 
42 See Murphy, supra note 35, at 959–60. 
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been satisfied that the case involves “concrete adversity” between the 
parties, thereby diminishing the concern that the issues presented may 
involve more generalized grievances.43 In other cases, the Court has 
required more than concrete adversity, emphasizing that a plaintiff 
must be injured in a particularized way and that the relief sought must 
benefit the plaintiff more directly and tangibly than it would the public 
at large.44 
 For some observers, an overly restrictive standing regime risks 
granting too much power to the political branches of the government, 
particularly in cases where only a court order can compel an agency, 
such as the EPA, to fulfill its statutory obligations.45 Some have even 
contended that, at best, the standing doctrine imperfectly serves sepa-
ration of powers principles,46 and have suggested the Court adopt al-
ternative mechanisms—such as an abstention doctrine—when evaluat-
ing the propriety of reviewing executive action.47 Other scholars, how-
ever, stress that the Court has always scrutinized whether a case has 
been brought by a proper plaintiff, particularly in actions where private 
parties seek to enforce public rights, and that the test outlined in Lujan 
is a reasonable means to ensure justiciability.48 
 Despite its primary focus on the separation of powers as a justifica-
tion for restrictive standing, the Supreme Court has never clearly dis-
tinguished private rights from public rights lawsuits for standing pur-
poses.49 Given the Court’s broad holdings that standing is a constitu-
tional requirement for jurisdiction, it appears that the Lujan test should 
apply to parties seeking to vindicate at least some types of common law, 
                                                                                                                      
43 See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–25 (1998); Murphy, supra note 35, at 952–60 (re-
viewing a series of decisions in which the Court flipped back and forth on whether to bar 
claims that involved generalized grievances). 
44 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74; Sunstein, supra note 39, at 226 (noting that a direct 
consequence of Lujan was that citizen-suit provisions, which are designed to allow private 
citizens to enforce public laws, are impermissible absent a showing of injury-in-fact). 
45 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 11, at 489–90. 
46 Id. at 467–75; see also Murphy, supra note 35, at 969. 
47 Elliott, supra note 11, at 515–16 (proposing a prudential abstention doctrine as an 
alternative); see Murphy, supra note 35, at 979–89 (suggesting the Court adopt a “rule of 
deference” in lieu of standing doctrine); see also Sunstein, supra note 39, at 168–79 (argu-
ing that historical practice supports the propriety of standing if the plaintiff has been 
granted a cause of action under governing law, regardless of whether the action is a “citi-
zen suit”). 
48 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich. 
L. Rev. 689, 704–07, 732–33 (2004); see Bellia, supra note 38, at 832–38. 
49 See Hessick, supra note 12, at 290; Nagle, supra note 11, at 479–80. 
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private rights claims in federal court.50 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky 
has argued the contrary, concluding that “[i]njury to rights recognized 
at common law—property, contract, and torts—[is] sufficient for stand-
ing purposes.”51 Despite the historical adequacy of such injuries for 
standing purposes, federal courts have recently applied the Lujan stand-
ing framework to litigants bringing common law claims against private 
parties.52 
2. State Standing and Article III 
 Although federal courts have often applied the Lujan test to private 
litigants, it was unclear until the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision Massa-
chusetts v. EPA whether the test applied to state litigants.53 In Massachu-
setts v. EPA, the Court required the lead state petitioner to satisfy the test, 
but also noted that states are not “normal litigants” for the purpose of 
standing and thus concluded that Massachusetts was entitled to “special 
solicitude” under the Article III standing framework.54 The Court prem-
ised this relaxed mode of standing in part on the states’ historical rights 
to litigate broader public interests in the federal courts.55 
 Historically, states have often presented legal interests that are dis-
tinct from those of “normal” private litigants, and those interests have 
led federal courts to treat states differently than individuals for standing 
purposes.56 Prior to the twentieth century, states asserting governing 
                                                                                                                      
50 See Massey, supra note 6, at 261 (noting that a private citizen who has suffered dam-
age to land due to a defendant’s acts must prove the Lujan elements to maintain a federal 
court action); Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. 
L. 293, 304–06 (2005) (concluding that states bringing common law nuisance actions in 
federal court should be required to satisfy standing requirements). 
51 Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 69 (5th ed. 2007). 
52 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 863–67 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Chemerin-
sky, supra note 51, at 69) (noting Chemerinsky’s assertion that common law injuries have 
historically been sufficient for standing, but nonetheless applying the Lujan framework to 
private party plaintiffs suing private entities in public nuisance action), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049 
(5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (restoring trial court’s dismissal of nuisance action); Am. Elec., 582 
F.3d at 341–49; Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877–82. 
53 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 336–38; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 307; cf. Merrill, supra 
note 50, at 299–305 (reviewing types of state-led suits that historically have not given rise to 
standing concerns, but concluding that parens patriae lawsuits brought in federal court should 
be subject to Article III and prudential standing limitations). 
54 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518–20. 
55 Id. 
56 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02 
(1982); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: 
Escaping the Common Law’s Growing Shadow, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111, 131–34 (discussing the 
Court’s historic recognition of state interests in sovereignty and territorial matters). 
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interests, as opposed to common law interests in contractual and prop-
erty rights, were largely prohibited from litigating those interests in the 
federal courts.57 This prohibition included litigating generalized griev-
ances on behalf of their citizens.58 At the turn of the century, however, 
the Supreme Court began to relax state standing requirements in pub-
lic nuisance actions, reasoning that even though the state could assert 
no traditional common law interest, “it must surely be conceded that, if 
the health and comfort of the inhabitants of the State are threatened, 
the State is the proper party to represent and defend them.”59 By allow-
ing states to vindicate generalized public harms in federal court, the 
Court retreated from its requirement that states resemble private party 
plaintiffs for standing purposes.60 Instead, the assertion of a state’s sov-
ereignty interests—interests relating to the state’s governing and regu-
latory powers—became sufficient to invoke jurisdiction.61 
 Today, courts recognize a category of state “sovereign interests” that 
generally give rise to a lenient standing threshold.62 This category in-
cludes a state’s ability to establish and enforce laws over individuals and 
entities within its jurisdiction63 and a state’s interest in preserving its law 
and regulatory jurisdiction from federal preemption.64 Similarly, where 
a state identifies a direct injury to its regulatory or economic interests 
under a federal administrative regime, a court will rarely perform a re-
strictive standing analysis, if it conducts a standing inquiry at all.65 
                                                                                                                      
 
57 See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387, 410–12 
(1995). 
58 See id. at 431–32. 
59 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 241; see Mank, supra note 6, at 1759–60. 
60 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 57, at 449. 
61 See id. at 456. 
62 See Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 311–15. 
63 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 311; see Woolhandler & Col-
lins, supra note 57, at 410–11. 
64 See, e.g., Alaska v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443–44 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ohio 
ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 232–33 (6th Cir. 1985); Florida v. 
Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488, 492–94 (5th Cir. 1974); Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 311, 313–
14 (noting that in several post-Lujan cases involving state sovereign interests, federal courts 
did not cite to Lujan or its three factors when deciding that the state had standing); see also 
Merrill, supra note 50, at 300–01 (noting that when a state vindicates its own laws in a crim-
inal prosecution, federal courts do not require it to satisfy Lujan); Metzger, supra note 16, 
at 69 (arguing that recent case law suggests that states can sue in their sovereign capacities 
to challenge a federal agency’s policy on preemption, even before a specific preemption 
conflict has arisen); Nash, supra note 16, at 1055–56, 1072–74 (arguing that a state’s sover-
eign prerogatives are offended when it is preempted from lawmaking, and that states chal-
lenging federal regulatory power should be entitled to relaxed standing). 
65 See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 914–15 (D.C. Cir. 2008); West Virginia 
v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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 States may also assert “quasi-sovereign interests” when bringing law-
suits on behalf of their citizens, and in these parens patriae actions, they 
must satisfy a distinct standing test.66 Unlike sovereign interests, which 
can be relatively easy to identify, quasi-sovereign interests are inherently 
broad and abstract and thus risk being too vague to survive standing re-
quirements.67 Therefore, in the 1982 decision Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. 
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, the Supreme Court held that a state must 
demonstrate that its quasi-sovereign interest is distinct and independent 
of the interests of the purely private parties on whose behalf the state 
litigates.68 The Court has identified two principal categories of such in-
terests: (1) the state’s interest in its citizens’ economic and physical wel-
fare, and (2) the state’s interest in ensuring that its citizens enjoy the full 
benefits of participation in the federal system, to which the state has sur-
rendered some of its sovereign prerogatives.69 These standing require-
ments are intended to distinguish parens patriae suits from cases in which 
the state has no independent interest at stake—an interest it presumably 
would have in a sovereign interest, or even a mere proprietary interest, 
lawsuit.70 
 Even where state plaintiffs can survive these standing require-
ments, however, states are generally barred from litigating as parens pa-
triae against the federal government, which the Court has characterized 
                                                                                                                      
West Virginia v. EPA involved a dispute over the revision of a Clean Air Act state implemen-
tation plan, an instrument primarily created and administered by the state but subject to 
federal oversight and requirements. 362 F.3d at 865–67. Although it did not involve a tradi-
tional preemption dispute or the enforcement of a unique state law, at least one scholar 
has considered it to be a sovereign interests case. Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 313–14. 
Overall, the sovereign interests category appears to have some flexibility. See id. at 314; 
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 57, at 410–11, 493; see also Metzger, supra note 16, at 69. 
66 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607–08; see Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 
(1907); Percival, supra note 56, at 131–34. 
67 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
68 Id. at 607; see Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 298–99. Observers have noted that a 
state’s “independent interest,” however potentially confusing and flexible a term, means 
an interest connected to the injury suffered by the state’s residents. See Wildermuth, supra 
note 16, at 298–99, 305, 317. 
69 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607–08. Additionally, the state must demonstrate that the defen-
dant’s actions have injured a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. Id. at 607. 
70 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 57, at 511–12. 
[S]tates that now litigate on the basis of parens patriae often have an inde-
pendent basis for standing. . . . Where a state has an independent legally pro-
tected interest, there is arguably no harm in allowing a state to sue addition-
ally as parens patriae. Such standing is analogous to that of private parties who 
have individually suffered harms suing as representatives of a class. 
Id. 
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as holding a superior role in the protection of the general welfare.71 
Ironically, however, the historical relaxation of state standing require-
ments may have been driven by the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
states’ interests in preserving their regulatory powers from federal in-
trusion.72 Today, observers have noted a steady increase in state chal-
lenges to federal administrative activity, particularly in contexts where 
the federal government has limited a state’s authority over matters af-
fecting a state’s land and citizens.73 In cases where states have suc-
ceeded in overcoming standing hurdles, courts appear to have inter-
preted the states’ interests as sovereign, rejecting the federal govern-
ment’s contentions that the states were suing as parens patriae.74 
 In light of the absence of any Lujan-styled standing tests in many of 
these state lawsuits against the federal government, courts have gener-
ally not identified any separation of powers concerns similar to those at 
the heart of lawsuits brought by individuals seeking review of executive 
action.75 Of notable exception were the dissenting opinions in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia argued 
that allowing a state to sue the EPA in a politically and scientifically 
complex regulatory context impermissibly drew the Court into an area 
largely reserved for executive discretion.76 Scholars have recently ar-
                                                                                                                      
71 See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 
(1923). Even though some scholars have argued that the bar prohibits only state lawsuits 
against unconstitutional acts of the federal government, subsequent case law interpreting 
Massachusetts v. Mellon have enforced the bar more broadly. See Wildermuth, supra note 16, 
at 308–09; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). But see 
Mank, supra note 6, at 1770 & n.386 (identifying federal court decisions that have allowed 
parens patriae suits seeking to enforce rights provided to citizens under a federal statutory 
scheme). 
72 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 57, at 456. The Supreme Court itself has stat-
ed that an important factor in determining whether a state has an independent, quasi-
sovereign interest sufficient for standing is whether the injury the state seeks to address is 
one that the state would address through its sovereign lawmaking powers. Snapp, 458 U.S. 
at 607. 
73 See, e.g., Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 287. 
74 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 868 (rejecting EPA’s contention that West Vir-
ginia was suing as parens patriae and holding that West Virginia had standing “as a state” 
due to injury caused by onerous federal regulatory requirements); Davis, 348 F.3d at 778 
(similarly rejecting EPA’s claim that a state lacked standing as parens patriae and identifying 
the state’s independent pecuniary and regulatory interests in litigation). 
75 See Merrill, supra note 50, at 299–301; Zdeb, supra note 6, at 1076–77 (arguing that 
the Court has held that traditional state standing tests are sufficient to ensure justiciability, 
even after it began widely applying the Lujan test to private litigants). 
76 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Relaxing Article 
III standing requirements because asserted injuries are pressed by a State, however, has no 
basis in our jurisprudence, and support for any such ‘special solicitude’ is conspicuously 
absent from the Court’s opinion.”); id. at 550–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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gued, however, that when a state brings an action challenging the pre-
emptive or otherwise burdensome effect of federal regulatory action, 
principles of federalism may justify a relaxed standing regime even 
where separation of powers principles would otherwise give rise to a 
heightened threshold.77 
B. Additional Prudential Limitations on Jurisdiction 
 Establishing Article III standing is only one threshold that a plain-
tiff must satisfy to survive a motion to dismiss; other prudential—that is, 
discretionary—doctrines may come into play when the issues raised by 
a lawsuit implicate separation of powers concerns.78 The prudential 
standing doctrine and the political question doctrine may bar lawsuits 
that touch upon the generalized grievances of the broader population, 
particularly when the political branches have not yet addressed those 
grievances.79 Several federal district courts have relied on the political 
question doctrine in dismissing climate tort actions, even those brought 
by state plaintiffs, and the federal government has argued that states 
are barred from litigating such claims under the prudential standing 
doctrine.80 
 Although it has been applied for different reasons in different con-
texts, the prudential standing doctrine generally focuses on whether it 
would be appropriate for the court to render judgment for one particu-
lar party when the litigation could impact a larger class of affected indi-
                                                                                                                      
77 See Massey, supra note 6, at 262 (“The best argument for relaxing the meaning of the 
Lujan elements when a state asserts a sovereign interest in federal court is that doing so is a 
necessarily implied aspect of the structural design of dual sovereignty.”); Metzger, supra 
note 16, at 70–75 (noting that separation of powers principles may need to bend to ac-
commodate federalism interests in ensuring the proper functioning of federal agencies, 
but that the Court has not yet articulated a justification along these lines); Nash, supra 
note 16, at 1073–74; see also Melamed, supra note 14, at 607. 
78 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) (“[A] party may have standing in a par-
ticular case, but the federal court may nevertheless decline to pass on the merits of the 
case because, for example, it presents a political question.”). 
79 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12 (discussing the importance of prudential standing in 
ensuring judicial restraint when the judiciary is faced with issues of “great national signifi-
cance”); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871–77 (dismissing a common law action on political 
question grounds); Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *12–13 (reasoning that policy 
questions concerning global warming emissions caps are reserved to the political branch-
es, which had not yet acted to address them); see also Murphy, supra note 35, at 952–60 
(analyzing the Court’s separation of powers “ping-pong” with regard to whether general-
ized grievances are justiciable). 
80 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871–77; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *16; 
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 
F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Brief for the Tenn. Valley Auth., supra note 9, at 13–24. 
2011] State Standing in Climate Litigation 1079 
viduals and potential plaintiffs.81 Because this standing doctrine is pru-
dential, it may be overridden by Congress, and in the public law context, 
Congress has in many instances provided statutory authorization for pri-
vate citizens to sue when issues involve more generalized harms and 
grievances.82 Thus, although the prudential standing bar against gener-
alized grievances may complement an Article III standing inquiry, it ap-
pears most relevant to cases in which Congress has not already provided 
an express right of action, such as in the common law context.83 
 Because the Court has stated that the contours of the prudential 
standing doctrine have not been “exhaustively defined,” the doctrine 
provides a malleable framework that could be used for dismissing novel 
claims for relief.84 Notably, in the 2004 decision Elk Grove Unified School 
District v. Newdow, a five-justice majority of the Court identified the doc-
trine as a means to dismiss cases involving broad matters of public sig-
nificance that would be better resolved by the political branches of the 
government.85 The Court therefore upheld a district court’s dismissal 
of an Establishment Clause challenge, based partially on the substantial 
family law issues implicated by the facts of the case.86 In a separate 
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, three justices ac-
cused the majority of creating a novel standing principle “loosely” 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation 
of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (identifying three prudential standing 
limitations); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500; Murphy, supra note 35, at 989. As the Supreme 
Court has stated: 
Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the 
standing doctrine, we have explained that prudential standing encompasses 
“the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, 
the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately 
addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plain-
tiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” 
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751). 
82 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (“Congress 
may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by pruden-
tial standing rules.”); Murphy, supra note 35, at 952. Of course, for the plaintiff to satisfy 
Article III standing when suing under a statutory regime, the plaintiff himself must be 
particularly injured. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74; Sunstein, supra note 39, at 226, 235–36. 
83 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162–63; Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (noting that a plaintiff may as-
sert Article III standing under a congressional right of action even where the alleged in-
jury is shared by a large class of other possible litigants, and “may invoke the general pub-
lic interest in support of [the plaintiff’s] claim”). 
84 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12; cf. Brief for the Tenn. Valley Auth., supra note 9, at 
13–25 (arguing that prudential standing doctrine constrains courts from hearing general-
ized grievances in common law global warming cases). 
85 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12. 
86 See id. at 13–18. 
1080 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1065 
based on a complex combination of state and federal law that inappro-
priately prevented the Court from reaching the merits of the dispute.87 
                                                                                                                     
 The political question doctrine is also designed to screen out dis-
putes that would be better resolved by the political branches of the 
government, but it is more explicitly framed around the issues pre-
sented to the court, rather than the parties.88 As one of the judiciary’s 
oldest justiciability doctrines focused on the interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions, the political question doctrine expanded as a pruden-
tial tool of judicial restraint during the New Deal era, and courts have 
been willing to stretch it to encompass common law actions that involve 
widely shared harms.89 Thus, a court applying the doctrine today has 
the discretion to apply a number of factors, first outlined by the Court 
in its 1962 decision Baker v. Carr, to determine whether the issues pre-
sented may cause the court to, among other things, make an initial pol-
icy decision otherwise reserved to the political branches.90 The central 
separation of powers concern in this regard is that the judiciary would 
establish new federal policies despite a lack of accountability to the po-
litical branches or to the voting public.91 A related but more functional 
analysis of the doctrine has prompted some scholars to argue that it 
properly allocates decisions to the branches of government that have 
superior expertise in particular areas, such as foreign policy.92 
 Notably, the Supreme Court has stressed that that the political 
question doctrine must be applied on a case-by-case basis because even 
 
87 See id. at 18–25 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
88 See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“The po-
litical question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve 
around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution 
to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.”); Jesse H. Choper, The 
Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 Duke L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005); Melamed, supra 
note 14, at 579. 
89 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871–77; Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? 
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 
237, 246–48, 258 (2002); see also Choper, supra note 88, at 1463, 1472–76 (“tentatively” 
suggesting that constitutional injuries that are widely shared may properly be treated as 
political questions). 
90 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (outlining six factors a court may consider to 
determine whether a case is justiciable, including whether the court would have to render 
an initial policy determination of a kind “clearly for nonjudicial discretion”); Kivalina, 663 
F. Supp. 2d at 872–77 (applying a “distilled approach” of the Baker test and holding that 
two of the Baker factors were implicated by a global warming tort action). 
91 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210; Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 
WL 2726871, at *16. 
92 See Choper, supra note 88, at 1465–69; Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Politi-
cal Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517, 566–67 (1966); see also Melamed, supra 
note 14, at 592–94. 
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seemingly politically charged cases may in fact be appropriate for judi-
cial review.93 Additionally, the doctrine is not supposed to turn on 
whether a case is large, complicated, or otherwise logistically difficult to 
manage, but instead on whether the claims could be resolved in a 
“principled, rational” way structured on judicial standards of review and 
reasoning.94 Despite these admonitions, however, several scholars have 
criticized the doctrine as overly discretionary and untethered from reli-
able legal standards.95 Observers have instead suggested that the 
“strangeness of the issue,” coupled with judicial “self-doubt,” is at the 
heart of courts’ application of the doctrine.96 
II. The Justiciability of State-Led Climate Lawsuits 
 In light of the federal government’s failure to adequately regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions, several states have crafted regulatory pro-
grams to mitigate and adapt to the anticipated effects of global warm-
ing.97 Several state attorneys general have also sought relief in federal 
court to combat interstate emissions.98 This Part discusses two of these 
state-led climate lawsuits: the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 decision Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA; and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
2009 decision Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., which the Su-
                                                                                                                      
93 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 209, 217. 
94 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
95 See Choper, supra note 88, at 1460 (discussing other scholars’ criticisms of the doc-
trine); Gore & Tarr, supra note 17, at 578 (noting the “messy state” of the doctrine); see also 
Barkow, supra note 89, at 260 (highlighting that the Court has emphasized “embroilment 
in politics” as a basis for dismissing lawsuits under the political question doctrine). 
96 See Melamed, supra note 14, at 592 (quoting Alexander M. Bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch 184 (1st ed. 1962)); see also John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, 
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
962, 1013–14 (2002) (stating that political questions are those which the court should not 
consider because they are “too political . . . [they are] potentially controversial questions in 
areas where courts are more at sea than usual, more lacking in the sort of legal resources 
that enable them to insulate their decisions from easy political counterattack”). 
97 Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 
1097–98, 1107–08 (2009); see California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755, 2007 WL 
2726871, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (noting that California had expended millions of 
dollars “to study, plan for, monitor, and respond to impacts already caused, and likely to 
occur, as a result of global warming”); Cutting & Cahoon, supra note 17, at 130–31. 
98 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 514, 518–20 (2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314–15 (2d Cir. 2009) (eight states seeking injunctive relief 
against six power generation corporations, which together produced ten percent of all 
greenhouse gases emitted in the United States), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (U.S. Dec. 6, 
2010) (No. 10-174); Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (state seeking damages for 
nuisance-related injuries caused by automobile emissions). 
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preme Court recently agreed to review.99 The two decisions illustrate 
the different separation of powers concerns that may be implicated by 
state-led lawsuits involving widely shared harms and controversial policy 
questions.100 Section A provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court 
decision, and also discusses different interpretations of the Court’s 
standing analysis and its applicability to common law actions like Ameri-
can Electric.101 Section B then provides a brief discussion of the Second 
Circuit’s decision in American Electric and the various hurdles the com-
mon law plaintiffs faced in establishing jurisdiction.102 
A. Massachusetts v. EPA: A Novel Approach to State Standing 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA demon-
strated an innovative approach to state standing by announcing a rule 
of “special solicitude” for the lead state petitioner in an action against 
the federal government.103 The Court also used the Article III standing 
test outlined in its 1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife104 to ana-
lyze whether the state had standing to sue, a novelty in itself consider-
ing the historical relaxation of state standing requirements and the fact 
that several post-Lujan decisions had declined to apply the three-part 
test to state litigants.105 In response, several scholars have sought to clar-
ify the types of state interests that formed the basis for the special stand-
ing rule; these scholars have reached various conclusions as to the 
rule’s future applicability to other state-led lawsuits, particularly parens 
patriae actions.106 
                                                                                                                      
99 See infra notes 103–148 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 103–148 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 103–137 and accompanying text. 
102 See infra notes 138–148 and accompanying text. 
103 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518–20; id. at 536–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s “novel standing rule”); Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 318 (not-
ing “new twists” in Court’s standing analysis); see also Welti, supra note 16, at 1753 nn.6–7. 
The term “special solicitude” had been used in previous Supreme Court opinions with 
regard to litigants who demonstrated particularly pressing needs and claims, but it had 
never been used in connection with a relaxed state standing regime. Stevenson, supra note 
17, at 20–26. 
104 See 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing this standing test). 
105 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–26; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 306, 313–
14; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 57, at 456; see also Merrill, supra note 50, at 304–06. 
106 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 6, at 1746; Massey, supra note 6, at 268, 277–80; Melamed, 
supra note 14, at 581, 584; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 73–74; Wildermuth, supra note 16, 
at 317; Welti, supra note 16, at 1765–67; Zdeb, supra note 6, at 1073. 
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1. Special Solicitude and the Separation of Powers 
 The case began in 1999, when a group of private organizations 
filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA, asking it to regulate green-
house gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the 
Clean Air Act.107 Four years later, the EPA entered an order denying 
the petition, and the organizations, joined by twelve states, sought judi-
cial review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.108 
Two of the three judges on the court of appeals agreed that the “EPA 
Administrator properly exercised his discretion” in denying the peti-
tion, but only one of them concluded that the petitioners had failed to 
demonstrate an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing.109 
                                                                                                                     
 Writing for a five-justice majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Ste-
vens held that the lead state petitioner was entitled to special solicitude 
in the Court’s standing analysis, emphasizing the petitioner’s procedural 
rights to judicial review under the Clean Air Act and the state’s unique 
“stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests” in light of its inability to 
independently regulate harmful greenhouse gas emissions.110 Notably, 
the concept of special solicitude and its relation to quasi-sovereign in-
terests was not briefed before the Court, and the decision does not 
make clear whether Massachusetts was even suing in its parens patriae 
capacity.111 Scholars have suggested that the term “quasi-sovereign” may 
have been used because the Court cited to a relatively obscure U.S. Su-
preme Court decision from 1907, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,112 for 
the proposition that states have historically been able to litigate broad 
environmental claims in the federal courts.113 After establishing this 
 
107 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 510. Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as 
codified, provides in part, “The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . 
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new 
motor vehicles . . . which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) 
(2006). 
108 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 504–14. 
109 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56–59 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007). 
110 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517–20 (citing to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(b)(1)). The Court also identified section 202(a)(1) of the Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7521(a)(1), as a congressional mandate to the EPA to protect Massachusetts, and thus may 
have considered this provision among the state’s “rights under the Act.” See id. at 519–20. 
111 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 5; Welti, supra note 16, at 1762. 
112 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
113 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519–20; Mank, supra note 6, at 1738–40 (sug-
gesting that the majority probably relied on Tennessee Copper because it supported the 
proposition that states have broader rights to invoke federal jurisdiction when they assert 
quasi-sovereign interests); Murphy, supra note 35, at 963. 
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special status, however, the Court did not perform a parens patriae stand-
ing test but instead applied the Lujan framework to the state’s asserted 
loss of coastal property, an interest the Court had previously character-
ized as an ordinary proprietary, as opposed to sovereign or quasi-
sovereign, interest.114 Holding that the petitioners did have standing to 
sue under this test,115 the majority concluded that the EPA had the au-
thority to regulate automobile emissions of greenhouse gases and could 
only refuse to do so if it either determined that such emissions did not 
contribute to global warming or if it offered a reasonable explanation as 
to why it would not undertake such a determination.116 
 Notably, the majority and the dissents split sharply over whether 
the decision violated underlying separation of powers principles.117 In a 
dissent joined by three justices, Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the 
primary purpose of the standing inquiry was to screen out cases that 
present generalized grievances better resolved by the political branches 
and noted that “[t]he very concept of global warming seems inconsis-
tent with [the Lujan] particularization requirement.”118 Reasoning that 
the majority’s “special solicitude” rule simply amounted to a dilution of 
the Lujan standing requirements, the Chief Justice argued that the de-
cision allowed the judiciary to become “a convenient forum for policy 
debates.”119 Justice Scalia joined the Chief Justice’s dissent but also of-
fered a dissent on the merits, arguing that Congress had vested the EPA 
with broad discretion to regulate air pollutants.120 The majority, by con-
trast, disavowed the notion that any separation of powers principles 
counseled against resolving the petitioners’ claim; stating that the “gist 
of the question of standing” is whether the petitioners had a sufficiently 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–26; Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (distinguishing proprietary interests from sov-
ereign interests). 
115 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526. 
116 See id. at 534–35. Three years later, the EPA finally did make such a determination, 
and has since begun the process of establishing a regulatory framework for greenhouse gas 
emissions under the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Find-
ings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
117 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517, 522; id. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Relaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries are pressed by a 
State, however, has no basis in our jurisprudence, and support for any such ‘special solici-
tude’ is conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion.”); id. at 550–53 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see also Murphy, supra note 35, at 964 (discussing the majority and dissenting justices’ 
views of the separation of powers principles implicated by the decision). 
118 See id. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., Thomas, J. & Alito, J., dissenting). 
119 See id. at 547. 
120 See id. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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personal stake in the litigation to ensure concrete adversity in the adju-
dication, the majority concluded that the Court could resolve the claim 
regardless of the fact that global warming could be construed as a gen-
eralized grievance.121 
2. Subsequent Interpretations of Massachusetts v. EPA 
 Several observers initially interpreted Massachusetts v. EPA as a de-
cision that could signal a more relaxed standing regime for environ-
mental lawsuits, particularly those involving procedural rights.122 When 
in 2009, however, the Supreme Court held in Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute that several environmental groups did not have standing to 
challenge certain U.S. Forest Service decisions, the scope of Massachu-
setts v. EPA was bridled.123 Recent commentary suggests that the Court’s 
special solicitude standing rule is restricted to states challenging federal 
administrative actions.124 Several scholars, however, have concluded 
that the decision offers a relaxed standing regime for states suing in 
their common law parens patriae capacities as well.125 
 The more restrictive readings of Massachusetts v. EPA generally sug-
gest that the state had standing due to its inability to regulate green-
                                                                                                                      
121 See id. at 517 (majority opinion) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); 
id. at 522 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)); see also Elliott, supra note 11, at 
482–83 (noting the Court’s emphasis on the “concrete adversity” model of standing). 
122 See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 Va. L. Rev. In 
Brief 53, 57–58 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon.pdf; 
Percival, supra note 56, at 128–40; see also Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future 
of Environmental Standing in Climate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 121, 124–25, 156 (2008) (suggesting that Massachusetts v. EPA could “usher in a 
new era of environmental standing,” but acknowledging the case’s potential limitations); 
Richard Lazarus, A Breathtaking Result for the Greens, Envtl. F. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash., D.C.), 
May–June 2007, at 12, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lazarus/docs/ 
columns/ColumnMayJune07.pdf. 
123 See 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149–52 (2009). Notably, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer 
argued that the Court should have held differently in light of the procedural rights analy-
sis involved in Massachusetts v. EPA. Id. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
124 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 50–52, 73–74; Welti, supra note 16, at 1775; see also 
Nash, supra note 16, at 1072–74 (arguing that a “null preemption” reading of Massachusetts 
v. EPA standing analysis avoids confusing aspects of alternative explanations of the deci-
sion). 
125 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 6, at 1767–74; Massey, supra note 6, at 277–80; Zdeb, supra 
note 6, at 1075–77 (arguing that Massachusetts v. EPA highlights that parens patriae suits can 
serve as an adequate alternative basis for state standing in climate change litigation); see also 
Matthew R. Cody, Comment, Special Solicitude for States in the Standing Analysis: A New Type of 
Federalism, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. 149, 162 (2009) (arguing that Massachusetts v. EPA signals 
a limited expansion of the parens patriae doctrine, allowing special solicitude for states that 
possess a procedural right to challenge federal action). 
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house gas emissions and the fact that the EPA, counter to the state’s 
interests in addressing the problem, refused to regulate those emis-
sions.126 In particular, one commentator has suggested that the Court 
adopted a “regulatory interest” theory of standing, positing that the 
state was injured by the government’s rulemaking decision and that 
this injury provided the basis for the relaxed Lujan analysis of the loss 
of coastal property.127 This theory of standing was echoed in an amicus 
brief filed in support of Massachusetts by Arizona and four other states; 
these states contended that the EPA’s regulation potentially preempted 
all independent state regulation of carbon dioxide emissions, thereby 
giving rise to an injury cognizable under Lujan.128 The amicus brief 
stressed that states retain at least some independent lawmaking powers 
under the cooperative federalism model of the Clean Air Act by high-
lighting, for example, that states can in some contexts adopt their own 
emission standards as long as the federal government has established a 
regulatory floor for those emissions.129 Thus, the federal government’s 
refusal to regulate carbon dioxide emissions impermissibly impeded 
the states’ residual abilities to enact state-specific standards.130 
 Observers have also noted how, during oral argument, several jus-
tices appeared interested in a 2004 decision by the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, West Virginia v. EPA, for the proposition 
that a state may have “special standing” when federal action causes a 
direct injury to a state “as a state.”131 Notably, the state plaintiff’s stand-
                                                                                                                      
126 See Nash, supra note 16, at 1072–74; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 8, 32–36, 51; Welti, 
supra note 16, at 1765–67; see also Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *11 (noting that 
“inherent in the Supreme Court’s reasoning” is the principle that a state, having surren-
dered its rights to independently regulate in certain circumstances, may challenge federal 
administrative decisions that it finds dissatisfying). 
127 See Welti, supra note 16, at 1765–68. 
128 See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
13–15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120). 
129 See id. at 14–15, 18–20. Under section 209 of the Clean Air Act, as codified, Califor-
nia is the only state permitted to set emissions standards for motor vehicles. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7543(a)–(b) (2006); Brief of Arizona et al., supra note 128, at 14–15. California may 
adopt its own standards if it applies for a waiver of preemption from the EPA and demon-
strates that the state standards would be no less protective of public health than federal 
standards. See § 7543(b). Once those standards are adopted, other states can “piggyback” 
on California’s standards. See § 7507. 
130 See Brief of Arizona et al., supra note 128, at 13, 20–25. The Supreme Court has 
held that even where a federal agency has decided not to regulate certain activities, such as 
in Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency’s refusal to regulate can be treated as the equivalent of 
ruling that no such regulation, either state or federal, is appropriate, thereby preempting 
state regulatory power. See Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978). 
131 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Mank, supra note 6, at 
1738–40; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 30–35; Welti, supra note 16, at 1768–70. 
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ing in West Virginia v. EPA did not rest on its interests as parens patriae 
but rather on its economic and regulatory interests in the outcome of 
the federal agency’s decisions.132 
 Although the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA did not cite to 
the D.C. Circuit decision or explicitly reference the amicus brief, it 
identified the preemptive effect of federal law as a basis for special so-
licitude, noted that the state was asserting “its rights” under federal law, 
and justified its analysis in part on the state’s “well-founded desire to 
preserve its sovereign territory.”133 This language, which appears to dis-
tinguish the state’s interests from its derivative interests in its citizenry, 
has led some lower courts to dismiss parens patriae actions against the 
federal government in which the state did not assert a sufficiently dis-
tinct claim of injury based on its own interests.134 
 Nevertheless, some scholars have argued that Massachusetts v. EPA, 
by identifying “quasi-sovereign interests” and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
as the basis for special solicitude, still provides states suing as parens pa-
triae a relaxed standing threshold.135 One scholar in particular has con-
ceded that Massachusetts v. EPA is most directly on point for state suits 
that involve a procedural right given by Congress, but has nonetheless 
argued that the decision “implicitly approved parens patriae standing in 
the absence of a procedural right.”136 Despite their arguments in favor 
of expanded parens patriae standing, however, several of these commen-
                                                                                                                      
132 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 868. 
133 See Massachusetts v. EPA, at 518–20, 520 n.17. Although the Court did not specify 
how states could be precluded from enforcing their own greenhouse gas regulations, two 
federal statutes potentially preempt state lawmaking in this respect: the Clean Air Act and 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”). See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) 
(prohibiting states from adopting or attempting to enforce standards related to the con-
trol of emissions from new motor vehicles); EPCA, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006) (forbid-
ding states from adopting or enforcing laws or regulations related to automobile fuel 
economy standards covered by federal law). After the Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, 
however, two federal district courts held that, so long as EPA grants California the right to 
independently set greenhouse gas emissions limits under the waiver process of the Clean 
Air Act, neither the Clean Air Act nor the EPCA would preempt such state regulatory 
power. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1189 (E.D. 
Cal. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 
295, 350 (D. Vt. 2007). 
134 See Citizens Against Ruining the Env’t v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Colorado ex. rel. Suthers v. Gonzalez, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1165 (D. Colo. 2007); see also 
Michigan v. EPA, 581 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2008). 
135 See Mank, supra note 6, at 1767–74; Massey, supra note 6, at 277–80; Zdeb, supra 
note 6, at 1073–78; see also Cody, supra note 125, at 162. 
136 Massey, supra note 6, at 277. 
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tators have acknowledged that, as a parens patriae decision, Massachusetts 
v. EPA is unconventional—and even confusing.137 
B. American Electric: Parens Patriae Standing and Global Warming 
 The Second Circuit in American Electric similarly expressed confu-
sion about the standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA and how it ap-
plies to parens patriae lawsuits.138 And unlike the state petitioner in Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, the state plaintiffs in American Electric sought injunctive 
relief against six power generation companies, alleging that the utili-
ties’ collective greenhouse gas emissions constituted a public nuisance 
under federal common law.139 Unlike the Supreme Court in Massachu-
setts v. EPA, the Second Circuit attempted to avoid ambiguity in its 
standing analysis by analyzing the states’ standing in two distinct capaci-
ties: parens patriae and proprietary.140 In so doing, the Second Circuit 
held that the states satisfied the parens patriae standing test articulated 
under the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,141 and also demonstrated a sufficient proprie-
tary injury under the Lujan test.142 Furthermore, in evaluating the 
states’ standing under Lujan, the Second Circuit incorporated reason-
ing from Massachusetts v. EPA into each prong of its analysis, ultimately 
relying on strands of the Court’s decision based on the similarities be-
tween the physical harms the states suffered in both cases.143 
                                                                                                                     
 By bringing their claims under common law, however, the American 
Electric plaintiffs also faced several additional hurdles not encountered 
by the petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA—in particular, whether the 
suit would force the court to render policy decisions more appropriate 
for the political branches, and whether their federal common law 
claims were displaced by the Clean Air Act or other federal legislation 
concerning greenhouse gas emissions.144 In reversing the judgment of 
 
 
137 See Mank, supra note 6, at 1746; Massey, supra note 6, at 268; Zdeb, supra note 6, at 
1073. 
138 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 338 (noting that the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA used 
“language that hearkened to a state’s quasi-sovereign interests” while applying the Lujan 
test to a proprietary injury, and asking, “Must a state asserting parens patriae standing satisfy 
both the Snapp and Lujan tests?”). 
139 See id. at 316. 
140 See id. at 338–49. 
141 458 U.S. 592 (1982); see supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
142 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 338–49. 
143 See id. at 341–42, 344, 347–49. 
144 See id. at 324, 369–88. The displacement question may become more relevant now 
that the EPA has begun establishing regulations for greenhouse gas emissions. See supra 
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the lower court, the Second Circuit held that the political question doc-
trine did not counsel dismissal, concluding that the judiciary possesses 
the institutional competence to resolve climate tort claims regardless of 
their novelty or complexity.145 Noting that the Supreme Court has 
rarely dismissed these cases as political questions, the Second Circuit 
reasoned that the common law claims did not involve policy questions 
that could only be determined by Congress or the Executive.146 Thus, 
the Second Circuit’s analysis differed substantially from the decisions of 
several lower courts that dismissed similar climate tort claims based on 
the political question doctrine.147 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari the following year.148 
III. Prudential Limitations and Parens Patriae Lawsuits 
 As the Second Circuit’s 2009 decision in Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power Co. illustrates, states may attempt to pursue their interests 
in combating widespread environmental harms under the common law 
rather than in administrative actions against the federal government.149 
And, as noted above, several commentators have concluded that states 
suing in their parens patriae capacities should be entitled to as relaxed a 
standing regime as Massachusetts received in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2007 decision Massachusetts v. EPA.150 Section A of this Part explores the 
                                                                                                                      
note 116. In American Electric, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs had stated a valid 
tort claim under federal common law, and that this claim had not been displaced by the 
Clean Air Act, which had not yet been used to address directly the types of emissions at 
issue in the case. 582 F.3d at 371, 381, 387–88. However, if the Supreme Court were to hold 
otherwise with regard to federal common law claims, states could possibly pursue state 
common law claims seeking substantially the same relief on the similar theories of harm; 
indeed, the plaintiffs in American Electric identified state common law as an alternative basis 
of relief in their lawsuit. See id. at 314. 
145 See 582 F.3d at 329. 
146 Id. at 321, 330–31. Interestingly, the court also linked the political question doc-
trine to the displacement issue, reasoning that where Congress or the executive branch 
can displace common law standards with their own legislative or regulatory standards, 
“there is no need for the protections of the political question doctrine.” Id. at 332. 
147 See id. at 324–30 (reversing lower court decision); Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon-
Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871–77 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (reasoning that a climate nui-
sance claim presented lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and re-
quired the court to make an initial policy decision better reserved to the political branches), 
appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010); Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at 
*12–13, 16. 
148 131 S. Ct. 813 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010). 
149 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314–15 (2d Cir. 2009). 
150 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–26 (2007); supra notes 135–137 and ac-
companying text. 
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boundaries of the separation of powers principles often invoked in re-
strictive standing decisions, and concludes that a relaxed standing re-
gime in state parens patriae actions would be consistent with these prin-
ciples.151 Section B demonstrates, however, that this is not the end of 
the story: common law actions that raise complex environmental issues 
involving widespread harms and grievances may give rise to discrete 
separation of powers concerns not implicated by statutory suits brought 
directly against the federal government.152 
A. Parens Patriae Standing and the Separation of Powers 
 The Supreme Court has consistently identified separation of pow-
ers concerns as the basis for its restrictive standing regimes; therefore, a 
restrictive standing threshold for state litigants bringing common law 
actions would have to be justified on a theory of separation of pow-
ers.153 Most decisions involving Article III standing, however, have in-
volved parties seeking to vindicate more generalized public rights by 
forcing the government to better enforce or comply with its own laws, 
particularly when it is unclear the party has suffered a distinct harm.154 
As a statutory petition for judicial review of agency action, Massachusetts 
v. EPA fits into this public law framework of cases.155 In a common law 
suit brought against a private polluter, however, the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff, the defendant, and the role the court is asked to 
play in resolving the dispute changes.156 Rather than collaterally attack-
ing government policy by asking the court to review an agency’s ac-
tions, the plaintiffs in a tort or property action seek relief from a harm 
directly caused by the defendants; the chains of causation and redress-
                                                                                                                      
151 See infra notes 153–169 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 170–190 and accompanying text. 
153 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992); see supra notes 36–
52 and accompanying text. 
154 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–51 (2009); Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 562–71; Hessick, supra note 12, at 296. 
155 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–20 (discussing the statutory framework at 
issue in the case and the relation between the Article III standing inquiry and statutory 
rights to judicial review); Nagle, supra note 11, at 494 (characterizing Massachusetts v. EPA 
as “the quintessential public law case”). 
156 Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 514, 516–18 (discussing petitioners’ re-
quest for judicial review of the agency decision), with Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 316–19 (review-
ing plaintiffs’ claims of injuries caused by defendants’ emissions, and their request for 
injunctive relief). 
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ability are thus “shorter” than those alleged in Supreme Court cases 
like Massachusetts v. EPA and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.157 
 As the judiciary is less likely to be asked to “oversee” the executive 
branch in common law suits, a moderate application of the Lujan fac-
tors in common law global warming lawsuits is sufficient to ensure that 
separation of powers values are protected.158 As illustrated by cases like 
Massachusetts v. EPA, Lujan, and the Court’s 1997 decision FEC v. Akins, 
the Court may apply the Article III standing test with varying degrees of 
intensity and scrutiny, depending on the majority’s sensitivity to the 
underlying separation of powers issues implicated by the suit.159 In both 
Massachusetts v. EPA and Akins, the majority identified the crux of the 
standing inquiry as whether the plaintiffs presented a sufficiently per-
sonal stake in the claim so as to ensure concrete adversity between the 
parties.160 This in turn diminished the concern that the adjudication 
would impact a larger group of people.161 
 Furthermore, several Supreme Court justices have likened the con-
crete adversity model of standing to the more traditional threshold in-
quiry of whether a particular victim of a “widespread mass tort” has 
standing to sue.162 Even Justice Scalia, whom many consider to be the 
principal architect of the restrictive standing framework, has conceded 
that each plaintiff in a mass tort action will likely suffer a sufficiently par-
ticular injury, despite the widespread nature of that injury.163 Not sur-
prisingly, the “widespread mass tort” analogy provides a strong founda-
tion for a relaxed standing regime in state-led tort actions.164 
                                                                                                                      
 
157 Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 510–14, 516–18, and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
559, 561–62, with Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 865 n.5 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting 
a shorter chain of causation in a tort claim for relief compared to a public law challenge), 
vacated, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (restoring the trial court’s dismissal of a 
nuisance action). 
158 Cf. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 338–49. 
159 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 (stating that Massachusetts was entitled to 
special solicitude in the Court’s standing analysis); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–25 (1998) 
(framing the issue of standing as whether the plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently concrete or 
too “abstract,” and then holding that a claim of informational injury was sufficiently con-
crete to support standing); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74, 577 (stating that claims involving 
generalized public grievances are nonjusticiable); Murphy, supra note 35, at 959–60. 
160 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962)); Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; Murphy, supra note 35, at 958–59. 
161 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522; Akins, 524 U.S. at 24. 
162 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25. 
163 See id. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that in a mass tort situation, every victim 
suffers particular injuries); Murphy, supra note 35, at 975–76. 
164 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; Am. Elec., 582. F.3d at 317–18 (listing different types of 
injuries suffered by states as result of climate change); see also Native Village of Kivalina v. 
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 The theory of harm in a case like American Electric essentially maps 
onto this private law “mass tort action” framework and, as such, does 
not implicate the separation of powers concerns embedded in public 
law litigation.165 But even if one were to believe that a parens patriae suit 
presents the same problems as a public law action, the special nature of 
parens patriae litigation suggests that any lingering separation of powers 
concerns could be resolved by a moderate application of the Lujan fac-
tors, particularly when they are coupled with the standing test outlined 
in the Court’s 1982 decision Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex 
rel. Barez.166 As the Court has specifically recognized, the Snapp standing 
test already ensures that lawsuits like American Electric contain a concrete 
interest that is judicially cognizable.167 In fact, the Snapp test was the 
only threshold for states suing as parens patriae throughout the period 
during which the Court began applying the three-pronged Lujan test to 
private citizens and associations bringing public law actions.168 Never-
theless, assuming that the Lujan test will continue to play a part in 
complicated parens patriae lawsuits, a moderate application of the test 
would be sufficient to ensure concrete adversity.169 
B. Prudential Limitations on Parens Patriae Actions 
 Even though state parens patriae litigants should be able to establish 
Article III standing under the Court’s separation of powers rationale, 
they may still have to overcome prudential justiciability thresholds; in-
deed, recent case law suggests that defendants will continue to rely on 
these doctrines to obtain dismissals of common law environmental ac-
tions.170 Regardless of whether the judiciary is ill-suited to adjudicate 
                                                                                                                      
 
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868–69 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing the impacts 
of climate change on a village of Inupiat Eskimos in a climate tort action), appeal docketed, 
No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010). 
165 See Nagle, supra note 11, at 511–13. 
166 458 U.S. 592, 607–08 (1982) (outlining the standing test for parens patriae lawsuits); 
see Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 338–49; cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the state must satisfy both the Snapp and Lujan standing tests when 
suing as parens patriae). 
167 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
168 See Zdeb, supra note 6, at 1076–77. 
169 See Merrill, supra note 50, at 304–05 (noting that the Lujan requirements were not 
developed in the state standing context, but should apply to parens patriae suits where a 
state sues outside of its own courts); Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 306–07; see also Am. 
Elec., 582 F.3d at 338–49 (analyzing, though not requiring, state standing under both the 
Snapp and Lujan tests). 
170 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871–77; California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-
05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); see also Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 
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complex climate tort suits or not, these lawsuits operate outside the 
safeguards and limitations of a national statutory framework, and (as in 
cases like American Electric) may call on the judiciary’s equity powers to 
establish a cap on the greenhouse gas emissions of regulated entities.171 
Additionally, the fact that the claims are non-statutory renders more 
problematic the fact that these cases involve “generalized grievances,” 
including the related problem that the injuries are caused by a large— 
and potentially global—combination of actors.172 Therefore, unlike the 
separation of powers concern embedded in public law litigation where 
the judiciary is asked to monitor executive action to ensure it satisfies 
congressional commands, common law actions give rise to a distinct 
separation of powers concern: that the judiciary will undemocratically 
create far-reaching law and policy.173 
 Overall, the federal judiciary’s reluctance to entertain climate tort 
suits seems to have less to do with the Article III standing of the parties 
and more to do with the complex and unprecedented nature of the 
issues that arise in the cases.174 Most importantly, recent case law illus-
trates that the prudential standing and political question doctrines are 
still—even after hundreds of years—undefined at their outer bounda-
ries, and invite courts to apply a fairly loose set of policy goals to dismiss 
                                                                                                                      
324–32 (evaluating defendants’ claims that a climate tort lawsuit violated the political 
question doctrine). Notably, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took 
a particularly strong stance against the applicability of the political question doctrine to 
common law tort claims, even singling out the General Motors decision and district court 
decision in American Electric as “legally flawed.” See Comer, 585 F.3d at 873–76. It similarly 
refused to apply the prudential standing doctrine to the plaintiff’s nuisance claims. Id. at 
868 n.7. This decision, however, was soon vacated by an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit. 
See 607 F.3d at 1055 (restoring trial court’s dismissal of nuisance action). For a helpful 
treatment of justiciability concerns in parens patriae actions brought in the product litiga-
tion context, see Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and 
Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 913, 947–50 (2008). 
171 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 318. 
172 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 875–77; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *15; 
see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (affirming that the 
bar on generalized grievances is still a viable prudential standing tool); Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
173 See, e.g., Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (noting that the doctrine is in part aimed 
at preventing a court from removing an important policy determination from the legisla-
ture); Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (emphasizing that the judiciary is not 
accountable to any other branch or to the people). 
174 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871–77 (relying primarily on the political question 
doctrine to dismiss a nuisance action); Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *6–8, 15–16; 
Gerrard, supra note 9, at 40; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that climate change, by its very nature, is nonjusticiable). 
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claims that involve widespread injuries or complex chains of causa-
tion.175 
 Although not intended to dismiss claims merely because they are 
politically charged, the political question doctrine does make it easier 
for a court to decline jurisdiction when it is faced with an unfamiliar or 
complex issue of law.176 The six factors the Court originally articulated 
in its 1962 decision Baker v. Carr operate independently of one another 
to dismiss political questions; among these factors is the consideration 
of whether the issues presented may cause the court to make an initial 
policy decision otherwise reserved to the political branches—a fairly 
loose concept in itself.177 What the Baker factors really boil down to is 
that where the political branches have not yet enacted clear standards 
and policies by which to address a widespread problem, the judiciary 
should avoid resolving even portions of that problem.178 Whereas some 
observers have championed the common law of nuisance as a mecha-
nism to fill the gaps left by legislative and regulatory inaction,179 the 
ongoing failure of the legislature to pass climate legislation—coupled 
with recent congressional attempts to prevent the EPA from regulating 
such emissions—suggests that defendants will continue to invoke the 
political question doctrine to dismiss climate tort lawsuits.180 Therefore, 
even in cases like American Electric, where states allege injuries similar to 
those found sufficient in Massachusetts v. EPA, plaintiffs will likely face 
                                                                                                                      
175 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11–12; id. at 18–25 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871–77 (applying a “distilled” version of the doc-
trine to common law tort claims); Choper, supra note 88, at 1460 (noting scholarly criti-
cism of the Court’s political question doctrine as overly discretionary and not bound by 
rule of law); see also Cutting & Cahoon, supra note 17, at 141 (arguing that in terms of the 
lower courts’ dismissals of climate tort claims on political question grounds, “the justicia-
bility issue is bogus . . . the courts probably just thought the cases were way too much work 
and that the legislative or executive action would eliminate need to decide the cases”). 
176 See Barkow, supra note 89, at 260; Choper, supra note 88, at 1460; see also Ferejohn & 
Kramer, supra note 96, at 1013–14 (characterizing political questions as those which the 
court should not consider because they are “too political . . . [they are] potentially contro-
versial questions in areas where courts are more at sea than usual, more lacking in the sort 
of legal resources that enable them to insulate their decisions from easy political counter-
attack”). 
177 See 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); accord Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *6. 
178 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *14–16; Melamed, 
supra note 14, at 591–94. 
179 See, e.g., Cutting & Cahoon, supra note 17, at 114–15, 139. 
180 See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Regulation Without Congressional Action, N.Y. L.J., 
Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202472923986 (discuss-
ing the failure of Congress to pass climate legislation and congressional attacks on EPA 
efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). 
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an array of political factors when bringing common law actions against 
private polluters.181 
 Similarly, the prudential standing doctrine applies more flexibly to 
parties than Article III standing because it allows a court to shift its in-
quiry away from whether the plaintiff has been sufficiently injured to 
whether the plaintiff is the right party to bring the lawsuit—essentially, 
whether the suit should be litigated at all.182 One might argue that 
there is no better party to bring a complex environmental suit than a 
state, but if a court is motivated to dismiss a lawsuit based on the under-
lying nature of the issues presented—as in the Supreme Court’s 2004 
decision Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow—then it logically fol-
lows that no party could be entitled to litigate it.183 In other words, if 
the underlying separation of powers concern is that the court will ren-
der a decision with broad policy implications, then it makes no differ-
ence whether the plaintiff is a state or a private citizen.184 
 This sort of analysis—framing the inquiry around the issues raised 
by the lawsuit rather than the injuries alleged by the parties them-
selves—is one that scholars criticize the Court for importing into the 
Lujan standing test.185 But the prudential standing doctrine allows a 
court to engage in such an overlapping mode of analysis; even scholars 
who have criticized the disingenuousness and incoherence of the Article 
III standing doctrine have conceded that the prudential justiciability 
doctrines may provide a more legitimate and transparent means with 
which to dismiss complicated lawsuits involving widespread harms.186 
 Underlying these significant drawbacks to state-led climate tort liti-
gation is the reality that Massachusetts v. EPA, a statutory lawsuit that did 
not involve prudential justiciability thresholds, can be of no assistance to 
                                                                                                                      
181 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d, at 321–32; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *6–16. 
182 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500; Murphy, supra note 35, at 989. 
183 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 13–18. 
184 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 536, 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing 
that doctrinal support for relaxed state standing is lacking, and that such a relaxed regime 
impermissibly allowed the Court to become a forum for public policy debates). 
185 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 11, at 466–67 (discussing other scholars’ criticisms of stand-
ing doctrine, including that it “cloaks in technical doctrine what are actually normative deci-
sions about the proper scope of government action,” and noting that even dissenting mem-
bers of the Court have accused majorities of using standing as a “cover” for improper analy-
sis). Indeed, in his dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to conflate 
the prudential justiciability doctrines with Article III standing when he argued that climate 
change, by its very nature, is nonjusticiable. See 549 U.S. at 541, 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing); accord Melamed, supra note 14, at 586. 
186 See Murphy, supra note 35, at 989–90; see also Elliott, supra note 11, at 508–10, 515–16. 
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state litigants in common law actions.187 In fact, at least one court has 
cited to the case for the opposite effect by highlighting how the decision 
underscores the complex political nature of climate change litigation.188 
The lack of statutory guidelines and standards makes climate tort law-
suits more likely to implicate these separation of powers concerns; in 
short, despite several scholars’ well-reasoned arguments to the contrary, 
Massachusetts v. EPA does very little to help states suing in their common 
law parens patriae capacities.189 Recognizing this should help motivate 
scholars—as well as state attorneys general who are concerned about 
global warming—to reevaluate how Massachusetts v. EPA can still help 
states combat climate change and other widespread environmental 
problems.190 
IV. Sovereign Interests and Special Solicitude 
 As Part III demonstrates, common law climate change lawsuits risk 
implicating particular separation of powers concerns, thereby render-
ing the preliminary stages of these lawsuits more complicated than 
statutory challenges like the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 decision Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA.191 This Part therefore proposes that scholars and fu-
ture litigants shift their focus away from how Massachusetts v. EPA ex-
panded parens patriae litigation to instead focus on how it provides a 
stronger basis for states asserting that the federal government has di-
rectly injured their lawmaking and regulatory capacities.192 Section A of 
this Part argues that Massachusetts v. EPA suggests a broader conception 
of sovereign interest lawsuits, as opposed to parens patriae actions, as the 
basis for special solicitude.193 Section B then provides an overview of 
the types of sovereign interest injuries that may be identified in future 
climate change litigation.194 
A. Massachusetts v. EPA as Sovereign Interests Precedent 
 Although several commentators have argued that Massachusetts v. 
EPA signals expanded parens patriae standing for states vindicating envi-
                                                                                                                      
187 See supra notes 170–184 and accompanying text. 
188 See Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *10–13. 
189 See Mank, supra note 6, at 1767–74; Massey, supra note 6, at 277–80; Zdeb, supra 
note 6, at 1076–77. 
190 See infra notes 191–235 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra notes 149–190 and accompanying text. 
192 See infra notes 191–235 and accompanying text. 
193 See infra notes 195–219 and accompanying text. 
194 See infra notes 220–235 and accompanying text. 
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ronmental injuries,195 limiting the decision to parens patriae standing 
overlooks a simpler reading that could prove more useful to states de-
veloping future climate litigation strategies: Massachusetts v. EPA as a 
sovereign interests precedent.196 Although the decision itself is not a 
traditional sovereign interest case in which a state asserts a discrete le-
gal right or regulatory power as its basis for standing, it does suggest a 
right to judicial review when the state’s lawmaking interests diverge 
from the federal government’s.197 Other scholars have identified simi-
lar rationales for the Court’s standing analysis, likening the decision to 
cases in which states assert direct injuries to their regulatory interests.198 
 Both the language of the opinion and the procedural background 
of the case support this sovereign interest conception of Massachusetts v. 
EPA.199 In opening its discussion of the state’s standing, the Court char-
acterized Massachusetts as a “sovereign state” and emphasized the 
state’s “well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory” in bring-
ing the action against the EPA.200 After conceding that the state had 
surrendered certain sovereign rights to the federal government as a 
condition of federalism, the Court nonetheless insisted that the state 
was asserting its own rights under federal law when it distinguished the 
suit from actions where a state litigates to “protect her citizens,” as in 
traditional parens patriae lawsuits.201 Thus, the Court strove to identify a 
concrete harm to the state’s unique interests—its ability to exercise its 
rights to regulate and protect its territory—and coupled this interest 
with the state’s rights under the Clean Air Act to seek review of harmful 
agency action.202 This line of reasoning is strikingly similar to cases 
wherein the state’s interest was considered sovereign, including cases in 
                                                                                                                      
195 See Mank, supra note 6, at 1767–74; Massey, supra note 6, at 277–80; Zdeb, supra 
note 6, at 1076–77; see also Cody, supra note 125, at 162. 
196 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–20 (2007); Welti, supra note 16, at 1773–
74. 
197 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–21; West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 865–
68 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Welti, supra note 16, at 1765–68, 1774. 
198 See Nash, supra note 16, at 1073–74; Welti, supra note 16, at 1765–68; see also Mank, 
supra note 6, at 1729; Melamed, supra note 14, at 584, 607; cf. Massey, supra note 6, at 262 
(“The best argument for relaxing the meaning of the Lujan elements when a state asserts a 
sovereign interest in federal court is that doing so is a necessarily implied aspect of the 
structural design of dual sovereignty.”). 
199 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–21. 
200 Id. at 518–19. 
201 See id. at 519–20, 520 n.17; see also West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 868 (concluding 
that state was suing “as a state” and not as parens patriae); Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 778 
(9th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing a state’s direct interests in litigation from parens patriae 
standing). 
202 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518–20; Welti, supra note 16, at 1766–67. 
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which the state retained only a residual lawmaking power under a fed-
eral regulatory program like the Clean Air Act.203 Additionally, the 
Court noted that another basis for special solicitude was the fact that 
the state’s lawmaking powers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
“might well be preempted,” and decisions involving preemption dis-
putes have largely been categorized as sovereign interests cases.204 
 The most confusing language in the Court’s opinion, therefore, is 
its use of the term “quasi-sovereign” when it appeared to identify a 
regulatory or sovereign right in the litigation as the basis for stand-
ing.205 The majority’s characterization of quasi-sovereign interests as a 
state’s own rights under federal law is inconsistent with how the Court 
has previously defined the concept—as fundamentally a derivative in-
terest in the welfare of the state’s citizens.206 Additionally, Chief Justice 
Roberts correctly asserted in dissent that states suing in their parens pa-
triae capacities are ordinarily barred from suing the federal govern-
ment—a claim that prompted the majority to stress further that it was 
premising its standing analysis on the state’s unique interests.207 
 Although future litigants and scholars could continue to grapple 
over whether Massachusetts v. EPA is a quasi-sovereign or a sovereign 
interests case, the Court’s use of the term “quasi-sovereign” does noth-
ing to diminish the well-established leniency shown toward states that 
assert their own lawmaking and regulatory interests as a basis for stand-
ing.208 In fact, the main problem with the Court’s use of the term is not 
how it impacts future sovereign interests litigation, but how it affects 
parens patriae suits such as American Electric, in which a perplexed Sec-
ond Circuit ultimately resorted to a traditional Snapp analysis of the 
                                                                                                                      
203 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 865–68; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 313–14; 
supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
204 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519; Alaska v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 868 F.2d 
441, 443–44 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that states suffered injury to their sovereign power 
to enforce state law because administrative rules threatened to preempt state statutes); 
Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488, 492–94 (5th Cir. 1974) (reasoning that a state had 
standing because a new federal law conflicted with state law and the state faced sanctions if 
forced to comply with federal standard). 
205 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518–21, 520 n.17; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 
317; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) 
(defining state sovereign interests). 
206 See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 298–99, 305, 317. 
207 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17; id. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
208 See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 868; Davis, 348 F.3d at 778; Alaska v. Dept. of 
Transp., 868 F.2d at 443–44; Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 
232–33 (6th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a state had standing to seek judicial review of 
federal regulation that claimed to expressly invalidate a state statute); Weinberger, 492 F.2d 
at 492–94; Merrill, supra note 50, at 299–301; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 318–20. 
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states’ quasi-sovereign interests rather than granting the states a blanket 
“special solicitude.”209 As discussed in Part III, parens patriae suits like 
American Electric involve separation of powers concerns that can give rise 
a more stringent justiciability threshold.210 Sovereign interests lawsuits, 
however, do not similarly invite a court to render initial policy decisions 
independent of a pre-established regulatory framework; they instead 
focus a court’s analysis on the concrete injuries to the state’s own inter-
ests.211 Sovereign interests suits, therefore, are particularized the way 
the Supreme Court requires public law litigation to be, and do not un-
dermine separation of powers values.212 This places them comfortably 
within the realm of the “special solicitude” the Court articulated in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.213 
 Similarly, a sovereign interest approach that frames the standing 
inquiry in terms of federalism concerns and states’ rights would likely 
appeal even to advocates of more restrictive standing regimes.214 Sup-
porters of heightened standing tests concede that where states chal-
lenge federal laws that directly impact state administrative machinery, 
standing requirements should be relaxed.215 “Special solicitude” stand-
ing in such actions would reflect the reality that in the modern admin-
istrative state, states challenging federal regulatory actions often are not 
concerned with the substance of the action itself but with how the ac-
tion impacts the state’s ability to regulate.216 
 Overall, future state litigants will increase their chances of invoking 
a relaxed standing regime if they forgo further manipulation of the 
scope of quasi-sovereignty, thereby avoiding the additional restrictions 
on states suing as parens patriae, and instead allege an injury to state 
lawmaking or regulatory capabilities.217 Under this framework, a state 
could satisfy the Lujan test by asserting: (1) an injury-in-fact to the 
                                                                                                                      
209 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 338–49. 
210 See supra notes 149–190 and accompanying text. 
211 Compare West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 868, and Davis, 348 F.3d at 778, with Gen. 
Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *10–13, 16. 
212 See Metzger, supra note 16, at 42. 
213 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519–20. 
214 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 57, at 508; see also Welti, supra note 16, at 
1774–79. 
215 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 57, at 508. 
216 Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 321; see Metzger, supra note 16, at 66. 
217 See Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 313–14 (noting that even where states asserting 
sovereign interests had to meet Lujan requirements, those requirements were easily met); 
see also Merrill, supra note 50, at 305 (suggesting that even though states suing in federal 
courts would have to satisfy Lujan, they “could satisfy these limitations . . . by showing that 
the State itself had suffered some injury in fact from the challenged action”). 
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state’s particular regulatory interests, (2) that the federal government’s 
actions caused the injury, and (3) that a favorable court decision would 
redress the injury.218 Specifically, as the following Section demonstrates, 
sovereign interests may be invoked in precisely the types of circum-
stances that cause states to seek vindication for injuries the federal gov-
ernment has refused to regulate adequately—such as in the climate 
change context.219 
B. Identifying Sovereign Interests in Future Litigation 
 As described above, a state could merit special solicitude at the 
threshold of a climate change lawsuit by asserting that it has suffered an 
injury to its interests in regulating and safeguarding its territory and 
citizenry, and that the federal government’s actions—or even inaction— 
is the cause of that injury.220 Such a regulatory dispute could arise where 
a state retains a concrete lawmaking or regulatory power under a fed-
eral administrative scheme, such as the Clean Air Act, and the federal 
government’s actions deprive the state from fully exercising its residual 
rights.221 Similarly, where a state alleges that federal regulation threatens 
to preempt the state’s independent regulatory efforts, federal courts 
would likely recognize that a sovereign interest is at stake and would 
therefore relax standing requirements.222 
 The most direct route for incorporating sovereign interests into 
future environmental litigation would be to identify an injury to a spe-
cific statutory right or duty retained by the state that would give rise to a 
concrete governing interest.223 The Clean Air Act does grant states 
some residual lawmaking capabilities, and in other regulatory schemes 
where states might seek to challenge federal power, states often retain 
similar levels of independence.224 In particular, California has been 
                                                                                                                      
 
218 Indeed, this is essentially the test articulated by several amicus states in Massachusetts 
v. EPA. See Brief of Arizona et al., supra note 128, at 14–15. 
219 See infra notes 220–235 and accompanying text. 
220 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 868; Nash, supra note 16, at 1055–56, 1072–74; 
Welti, supra note 16, at 1765–68. 
221 See Davis, 348 F.3d at 778 (state had a direct interest because it was a direct recipient 
of denial of waiver of a federal oxygen level requirement); Brief of Arizona et al., supra 
note 128, at 18–19; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 318–20. 
222 See Alaska v. Dept. of Transp., 868 F.2d at 443–44; Celebrezze, 766 F.2d at 232–33; Weinber-
ger, 492 F.2d at 494; see also Metzger, supra note 16, at 69; Nash, supra note 16, at 1073–74. 
223 See Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 318–20. 
224 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006) (outlining state involvement in 
creating plans to meet national air standards); id. § 7543(a)–(b) (allowing eligible states to 
apply for waivers from EPA in order to set independent emissions standards); Brief of Ari-
zona et al., supra note 128, at 18 (clarifying that “not all state regulation in this area is fore-
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granted significant regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act to es-
tablish emissions standards independent of the federal government, 
and observers have characterized California’s interests as “sover-
eign.”225 But even where the state’s interest may be less explicit, recent 
case law indicates that federal courts will nonetheless consider the 
state’s interests under the statutory scheme to be substantial enough to 
merit a relaxed standing threshold.226 These cases suggest that where a 
federal agency’s actions are onerous, burdensome, or otherwise damag-
ing to the state’s regulatory interests, special solicitude is warranted.227 
A state may even have a sovereign interest where the federal agency ab-
stains from action and refuses to enforce its own regulations, thereby 
causing injury to the state’s interests in ensuring it receives the benefits 
of the federally administered regulatory scheme.228 
                                                                                                                     
 A more generally applicable source of regulatory interest standing 
is a state’s claim that federal law threatens to preempt the state’s inde-
pendent efforts to regulate an environmental harm.229 Several federal 
appellate court decisions indicate that a state has a sovereign interest in 
preserving its lawmaking and regulatory powers, even where the fed-
eral government’s laws may ultimately preempt those powers.230 None 
 
 
closed” in discussing the Clean Air Act); Carlson, supra note 97, at 1107–08, 1125–28; Wel-
ti, supra note 16, at 1779 (noting that the Clean Air Act creates a high degree of “coopera-
tive federalism”); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006) (reserving state author-
ity under the Clean Water Act). 
225 See Brief of Arizona, supra note 128, at 13–14; Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 318–20. 
226 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 914–15 (D.C. Cir. 2008); West Virginia v. 
EPA, 362 F.3d at 865–66, 868 (detailing the emissions budget process under a federal ad-
ministrative scheme and the consequent economic burden on states to meet the stan-
dards); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519–20. 
227 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 914–15; West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 865–
66, 868; Davis, 348 F.3d at 778. 
228 See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999); see al-
so Nash, supra note 16, at 1055–56, 1072–74 (offering a theory of “null preemption” and 
linking it to relaxed state standing); cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 511–13 (adminis-
trative agency abstained from regulating harmful pollutant). As the Fifth Circuit has stat-
ed: 
Moreover, the FCC’s refusal to exercise its declared authority does not de-
prive states of standing. The states point out that the District of Columbia 
Circuit will not find a lack of standing simply because an agency has refused 
to enforce its own regulations. . . . For the same reasons, we also reject the 
FCC’s standing defense. 
Texas Office, 183 F.3d at 449. 
229 See Brief of Arizona et al., supra note 128, at 13, 20–25; Wildermuth, supra note 16, 
at 313–14, 318; see also Melamed, supra note 14, at 606–07; Metzger, supra note 16, at 69. 
230 See, e.g., Alaska v. Dept. of Transp., 868 F.2d at 443–44; Weinberger, 492 F.2d at 494; 
Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 313–14 (concluding that preemption cases illustrate the 
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of these cases dilute the state’s interests to a “quasi-sovereign” status, 
despite the fact that the federal government’s power is often treated as 
superior under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.231 Thus, 
many federal courts would likely determine that states do retain a sov-
ereign interest in their lawmaking and regulatory powers when the 
states are either subjected to claims of federal preemption or assert the 
claim themselves to establish that their independent regulatory efforts 
are allowed.232 
  The precise contours of sovereign interest standing in the climate 
change context will evolve as the federal government develops a 
framework for regulating greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean 
Air Act or another statutory scheme; once the federal framework has 
matured, states likely will, if anything, be more able to identify concrete 
interests in litigation.233 Thus, sovereign interest lawsuits would in the 
long run achieve the same goal the climate tort lawsuits are ostensibly 
trying to achieve today: filling the gaps of federal environmental regu-
lation.234 In that sense, these lawsuits would not signify a shift away 
from directly punishing the nation’s worst polluters, but would instead 
ensure that states continue to play a meaningful role as ancillary en-
forcers in administering a comprehensive federal scheme.235 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 By examining separation of powers dynamics in both the common 
law and the statutory law contexts, this Note provides an analysis of justi-
ciability that extends beyond recent climate change litigation to help 
 
“special nature of sovereign interests” in that “a state has a sovereign interest in preserving 
its law and its jurisdiction over lands and waters, even if ultimately unsuccessful”). 
231 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see Wildermuth, supra note 16, at 314. 
232 See Alaska v. Dept. of Transp., 868 F.2d at 443–44; Weinberger, 492 F.2d at 494; cf. Nash, 
supra note 16, at 1076–77 (proposing that courts recognize a new cause of action under 
which a state could challenge a government’s refusal to regulate in an area where the state 
may be preempted from regulating, and arguing that the reviewing court should allow 
states to regulate if the applicable statute could not be read to provide the federal gov-
ernment with the power to regulate). 
233 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 914–15; West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d at 865–
66, 868. As mentioned above, the EPA is currently in the early stages of implementing 
greenhouse gas regulations under the Clean Air Act. See supra note 116. 
234 See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 330 (noting that federal common law can fill in gaps of 
federal regulatory frameworks); Cutting & Cahoon, supra note 17, at 114–15; Gore & Tarr, 
supra note 17, at 585. 
235 Cf. Carlson, supra note 97, at 1125–28 (describing how California has been the na-
tional leader in setting higher mobile source emissions standards under the Clean Air 
Act). 
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guide states in proactively litigating for better regulatory protection of 
their citizens and environments. Specifically, the Note argues that state 
attorneys general should focus on asserting injury to their states’ unique 
interests in regulation in order to establish Article III standing. By doing 
so, state litigants could shift federal courts’ attention from the complex-
ity and widespread nature of the issues implicated by the lawsuits, to the 
merits of the state as the proper party to pursue such claims. Overall, by 
framing state-led lawsuits in terms of statutory law, federalism, and sov-
ereignty, rather than in science and widespread environmental harm, 
state plaintiffs should have an easier time invoking a relaxed standing 
threshold, and should thus be able to dedicate more effort to the merits 
of their claims. 
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